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   Numerous books and articles have addressed the question of the relevance 
of culture to the negotiating process. This chapter offers the proposition that 
although language and communication patterns may be seen as a part of culture, 
it is useful to treat communication as a distinct, intermediary concept. Indeed, at 
the end of the twentieth century communication, along with knowledge and 
information, is gradually driving our societies into a post-industrial phase, a 
revolutionary change not unlike the change from agrarian to industrial society. 
My second proposition is the importance of the comparative approach, and the 
selection of appropriate subjects for comparison.
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
   In a television interview, the noted political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset 
made the statement that if you study only one country, then you cannot know 
any country, because to understand what is unique one must do comparative 
work. Having edited for almost fourteen years an international interdisciplinary 
journal Studies in Comparative Communism,' I am, of course, keenly aware of the 
advantages of the comparative method, and that is what brings me to go beyond 
my study of the Japanese negotiating behavior (Berton, 1982; 1995; 1996) 
   This chapter addresses the impact of culture and communication upon the 
negotiating behavior of the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Soviets (as well as the 
successor Russians). I attempt to construct a framework of the concepts of 
culture, communication, and negotiation, and introduce, in a comparative 
fashion, some of the basic characteristics of Japanese, Chinese, and Soviet/ 
Russian negotiating behavior. Implicit in this endeavor are implications of these 
negotiating behaviors for American and other negotiating counterparts. 
Although this chapter is based on a large number of primary and secondary 
works on the subject (including my own), it is obvious that a comprehensive 
coverage of the three concepts of culture, communication, and negotiation and 
four national behavioral characteristics could easily fill twelve books. My aim,
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therefore, is much more modest : to present and develop some theoretical frame-
works and illustrate, in a comparative fashion, the cases of Japan, China, and the 
Soviet Union/Russia.
SELECTION OF SUBJECTS 
   The choice of Japan, China, and the Soviet Union/Russia is dictated by the 
fact that I have been studying and teaching international relations in the Asia-
Pacific region for over forty years, starting at a time when they were known as 
"International Relations in the Far East." Along with the United States, the 
countries chosen also happen to be the most important players in the region. We 
are, therefore, frequently involved in negotiations with these powers, as can be 
often seen on the front pages of our newspapers and on television news. Last, 
but not least, I have some familiarity with the languages concerned. 
   The Soviet Union was a bitter antagonist of the United States and its allies 
for the entire period of the Cold War. Communist China was involved in a hot 
war with the United States and its allies on the Korean peninsula, and both 
Communist superpowers carried on negotiations with the United States for 
decades on end. This gave rise to a number of books, pamphlets, and articles 
describing the difficulties encountered in dealing with representatives of these 
Communist countries. Negotiations with Japan gathered steam as the balance of 
payments turned sharply against the United States and the Japanese market 
remained partially inaccessible for American products and services. 
   The rapid expansion of trade and steady development of economic relations 
between the United States and the rest of the world has resulted in a phenomenal 
growth in face-to-face business negotiations with foreign businessmen. This 
has created a cottage industry of books explaining how to deal and negotiate 
with the Japanese and the Chinese, and after the demise of the Soviet Union on 
how to negotiate obstacles in the chaotic new Russian market. In the case of 
Japan, an ever growing number of books also tackled the allegedly superior 
Japanese business management techniques. 
   Because of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Russian 
Federation as an independent state and successor to the Soviet Union, we have 
to deal with four powers, but five different cultures, and five political and social 
organizations. In selecting appropriate negotiation case studies, we can choose 
from among the United States' dealings with China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and 
Russia ; China's negotiations with Japan, the Soviet Union, and Russia and 
Japan's negotiating experience with the Soviet Union and Russia-a total of nine 
dyads.
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SPECIALISTS VERSUS GENERALISTS 
   There has always been a tug of war between the generalists and the 
specialists. In the field of negotiation studies, there are those who stress the 
importance of general theory applicable to all negotiations, while others point to 
the importance of national differences. 
   These national differences start with the culture of a given nation, its social 
structure, communication patterns, and language. And although Communism as 
we knew it during the Cold War is dead, the Leninist state has imposed certain 
characteristics on the practice of negotiations which were often stronger than 
national characteristics.' Thus, dealing with the Chinese, we need to be reminded 
not only of Chinese cultural characteristics, but also of negotiating attributes of 
a Leninist state. Similarly, in dealing with present-day Russia, we should not 
forget that the senior policymakers were almost all Communist Party func-
tionaries who grew up in a Leninist state culture. 
   The generalists (Zartman & Berman, 1982; Zartman, 1993), while conceding 
that culture does affect the perceptions and assumptions of negotiators, bring 
out two counter-arguments. The first is that negotiation is a universal process, 
using a finite number of behavioral patterns. The second is that the plethora of 
international organizations have spawned an international diplomatic culture 
that socializes all diplomats into similar behavior.
VARIABLES OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
   To follow up on theoretical questions, the following six variables are, in my 
view, vital in the negotiation process : (1) Distribution of power, (2) Issues to be 
negotiated, (3) Type of relationship between the negotiating parties, (4) Past 
record of negotiations, (5) The venue of negotiations, and (6) Personalities of the 
negotiators. 
   Power is extremely important in negotiations, although even preponderance 
of power does not guarantee an overwhelmingly favorable outcome for the 
stronger party. Here, I would take exception to Gerald Steibel's dictum that 
"Negotiation is a direct function of national strength" (Steibel
, 1972, p. 37). Some 
twenty-five years ago, a political analyst ventured the thought that North 
Vietnam and Israel had much more influence than their relative standing in the 
world's hierarchy of power. Nonetheless, it is important to take into account 
who is the stronger party in any negotiations and by what margin. To show the 
importance of power relationship, I have entitled my study of Japan's claim to 
the four northern islands occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of World War 
II, "Prospects for Soviet-Japanese Relations-Legality, Morality, and Reality" 
(Berton, 1986), to indicate that while the historical, legal, and moral arguments
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may be in Japan's favor, the reality of Soviet power in 1985 vis-a-vis Japan 
precluded a negotiated settlement of this territorial dispute in Japan's favor. 
   Issues to be negotiated need to be classified in terms of their importance. 
The first distinction can be along the lines of what I would call "high politics" 
issues versus "low politics" issues. For example, national security, territory, and 
arms control clearly fall into the first category, while trade (except commodities 
essential for national security), administrative matters, cultural exchange, and 
environmental issues could be categorized as "low politics." 
   Type of relationship between the two parties sets the tone for the negotiating 
process. In my study of Sino-Soviet relations (Berton, 1985), I have developed a 
hierarchy of seven types of cooperative/conflictual relationships between states : 
(1) allies, (2) quasi-allies, (3) entente, (4) equidistance, (5) detente, (6) cold war, and 
(7) hot war. 
   It is obvious that negotiations between the United States and Japan, who are 
signatories to a security alliance, differ from those with states in an adversarial 
relationship. In turn, adversarial relationships can range from a shooting war to 
a cold war to a detente. 
   Past record of negotiations. Here it is useful to distinguish between the 
process of reaching an agreement and the way the agreements were (or were not) 
lived up to. The length of the relationship is likewise important, as it provides 
some measure of predictability of future behavior. And, finally, it is important to 
know how many negotiations resulted in a satisfactory conclusion of an 
agreement, how many ended in a draw, and how many deadlocked and broke up. 
   The venue of negotiations. There is obviously home court advantage, in terms 
of proximity to higher policymakers, logistics, psychological atmosphere, and 
the like. But on occasion, a neutral site can have certain benefits. 
   Personalities of the negotiators matter a great deal in terms of their status, 
ability, knowledge, experience (including institutional memory), and psycho-
logical makeup.
PSYCHOANALYTIC AND PSYCHODYNAMIC APPROACH 
   Reference to personalities of the negotiators, and especially their psycho-
logical makeup, leads me to a discussion of the psychoanalytic and psycho-
dynamic approach. The psychoanalytic approach was one of Daniel Bell's "Ten 
Theories" attempting to explain Russian behavior (Bell, 1958). Bell cited the 
work of the late Nathan Leites who applied psychoanalytic concepts to the study 
of Soviet behavior at the RAND Corporation. Psychological analysis usually 
addresses conscious conflicts, and the psychological insights are added to 
political, economic, social, and other dimensions. The psychoanalytic approach,
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on the other hand, taps into and stresses the unconscious motivation and 
intrapsychic conflicts of individuals and the collective group ideologies. 
Without trying to bog you down in psychoanalytic jargon, I will introduce three 
important psychoanalytic defense mechanisms vital to the process of nego-
tiation, and show how they influence communication and negotiations in the 
international arena. They are : (1) Identification, (2) Projection, and (3) Projective 
Identification'. Projection and identification are known as defense mechanisms 
designed to protect the individual or group from danger (real or imagined). More 
specifically, these primitive defenses show how some individuals ascribe certain 
delusional fantasies to others, and how easily perceptions, reality testing, and 
judgement become obscured or distorted. 
   Identification plays an important role in group psychology, for it explains 
why individuals who adhere to certin cultural mythic origins need to form an 
identification with a leader (or an idea or ideology) who concretizes the group's 
beliefs. The magnification of the group's "badness" is projected onto this mes-
sianic leader. All the badness lies in the outcast, the invader, the outsider as the 
"enemy
," the invader into the group's harmony. In regressive groups, somewhere 
lies a savior who will save the group from calamity, e. g., catastrophic change. 
   Projection is a term many of us are familiar with. It is a one way process 
whereby one imbues another person with certain qualities, attributes or traits. 
Stemming from the infant's earliest primitive desires and fantasies, unresolved 
aspects of the self one imparts an image and puts it into another, usually an 
idealized individual whose demeanor embodies these fantasies. For example, a 
president of a large corporation becomes in the eyes of the employees an 
idealized good parent, one who will meet their every need, become the caretaker, 
the nurturer, the provider, or will make up for the shortcomings of a missing 
childhood. It is a one way process because in this instance, the president does not 
identify with the projection or the group's fantasy and somehow manages to 
stay "on task." Similarly (as discussed below, under amae) one might speculate 
that the Japanese negotiators project onto the Americans the attributes of a 
stronger, elder brother/parent aspect and expect "special" treatment. The 
Chinese, for example, having faced British aggression and forceful British 
negotiators in the nineteenth century, may now unconsciously project that 
image when negotiating with the Americans, the new hegemons. 
   Projective Identification is a two-way process, whereby one projects an 
unconscious fantasy into the other and the other does identify with the 
projection (Klein, 1957). It is an unconscious form of communication designed to 
get rid of one's worst fears. This phenomenon is something of a role reversal, 
whereby one wants to get rid of some dangerous aspects of the self. The process
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puts into the other such intolerable feelings as fear, undue amount of 
responsibility, guilt, shame. This process is covert and often creates in the 
recipient of the projection feelings of urgency, confusion, chaos, guilt, shame, 
envy, and many other unconscious feelings. For example, in negotiations 
members will remain unduly silent, forcing the others to unconsciously 
overreact and take on a care taking role. Again, to come back to Japanese-
American negotiations, it would become a two-way projective identification, if 
the Americans should accept the role the Japanese project onto them and 
respond according to Japanese expectations.
CULTURE
   The sequence "Culture-Communication-Negotiation" implies that there is 
a direct connection between a given group's (or country's) culture and its 
communication patterns (including language). The latter, in turn, greatly affect 
the group's (or country's) negotiating behavior. 
   When one deals with questions of culture or national character or social 
group characteristics an important caveat is in order. One can always find 
cultural norms in one country that are also prominent, though to a lesser degree, 
in another country. One should also remember that some members of a given 
society (though a distinct minority) do not behave as the dominant majority. In 
other words, one can always find exceptions to the rule, and thus, broad-brush 
discussions of any society are by definition suggestive of general trends only. 
   What do we mean by culture? One can find well over a hundred definitions 
of culture in the social sciences, but let us offer here a few : 
       Culture is a shared system of symbols, beliefs, attitudes, values, 
   expectations, and norms for behavior. (Bovee & Thill, 1992) or 
      National culture is that component of our mental programming which 
   we share with more of our compatriots as opposed to most other world 
   citizens. (Hofstede, 1989) 4 or 
       Culture is a set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs 
   that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behavior. 
   (Faure & Rubin, 1993, p. 3) or 
      [culture is] an integrated system of basic assumptions, both normative 
   and factual, about the nature of human beings and the social, physical, and 
   metaphysical environment in which they exist. (Cohen in Faure & Rubin, 
   1993, p. 24). Still another definition of culture includes group prejudices. 
   Courtland Bovee and John Thill (1992), in discussing cultures and inter-
cultural communications, note that cultures and subcultures vary in terms of (1) 
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Stability, (2) Complexity, (3) Composition, and (4) Acceptance. 
   Stability. Conditions in the culture may be stable or may be changing slowly 
or rapidly. The transition from the Soviet Union to Russia, accompanied as it is 
by massive changes from command economy to market relations and from 
totalitarianism to democracy (as yet undefined and evolving Russian brand), is 
bound to affect cultural mores. By way of contrast, Japan is a good example of 
a slowly changing culture. In the mid-1850s, after two and a half centuries of 
self-imposed isolation, the Japanese were forced to join the international 
community by Commodore Perry's black ships. But to minimize the shock to the 
system, the young leaders of the Meiji restoration adopted the slogan of 
"Western technology" and "Eastern Morals
." They attempted to achieve not a 
symbiosis of the two worlds, but a careful grafting of useful "modern" innovation 
onto the fundamentals of Japanese culture. At the same time in China, this 
attempt failed, paradoxically because of the strength of Chinese tradition, 
whereas Japan as a country with a long record of cultural borrowings was 
always ready to adopt and adapt foreign ideas. Drastic cultural change in China 
had to await the revolution of 1911 ending centuries of Manchu rule, and 
especially the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist "people's republic" in 
1949. A slower, but nonetheless significant change is taking place in China right 
now when Leninist politics are asked to coexist with modified capitalist 
economics. 
   Complexity. Cultures vary in the accessibility of information. In the United 
States, information is contained in explicit codes, including words ; whereas in 
Japan, a great deal of information is conveyed implicitly, through nonverbal 
communication, body language, physical context, and the like. Another way of 
looking at this phenomenon is the concept of low-context and high-context 
communication postulated by the anthropologist Edward Hall (1976, p. 79) : 
       A high-context (HC) communication or message is one in which most of 
   the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the 
   person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the 
   message. A low-context (LC) communication is just the opposite ; the mass 
   of the message is vested in the explicit code. 
   Hall (Hall, 1976 and Kohls, 1978) rank ordered cultures from low-context 
(explicit) to high-context (implicit) : the most explicit was the Swiss-German, 
followed by the German, Scandinavian, the United States, French, English, Italian, 
Spanish, Greek, Arab, Chinese, and lastly, the most implicit, Japanese. More on 
that later. Though the Russians were not a part of this project, they tend to be 
higher-context than the Americans, in that they would emphasize the context. 
   Composition. Some cultures are made up of many diverse and disparate
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subcultures ; others tend to be more homogeneous. Japan is, of course, the prime 
example of the latter, whereas Russia is a good example of the fcr, mer, with 
China falling somewhere in between.' 
   Acceptance. Cultures vary in their attitudes toward outsiders. Some are 
openly hostile or maintain a detached aloofness. Others are friendly and coop-
erative toward strangers. Again, Japan, as an insular society, is a classic example 
of the former, and the United States of the latter. China historically treated 
foreigners as uncultured barbarians. The Russians with their history of foreign 
invasions have naturally tended to look askance at foreigners. And lastly, at the 
present time, China and Russia, as Communist and post Communist societies, 
display a great deal of suspicion toward foreigners.
Japanese Culture 
   Let us begin to discuss some socio-cultural characteristics of Japan, China, 
and Russia, and their effect upon their respective negotiating styles. Starting 
with Japan (Berton, 1995; 1996),6 one should first mention Nihonkyo (Japanism), 
a term used by the social critic Yamamoto Shichihei.' This is a kind of tribalism 
that so thoroughly permeates all aspects of Japanese life and personality that its 
followers are not even conscious of their adherence to its doctrine. The doctrine 
of Nihonkyo is a simple, indefinable system of concepts characterized by the 
worship of tradition, which is essential in the Japanese personality. The concept 
of Nihonkyo fits nicely with Robert Christopher's (1983) contention that "the 
Japanese people as a whole have only one absolutely immutable goal-to ensure 
the survival and maximum well-being of the tribe." 
   Next, we should mention that in Japan group orientation, rather than 
individualism, is paramount (Nakane, 1970).8 This leads to a strong group 
identity and "we-they" mentality. As for group dynamism, hierarchical struc-
ture is prevalent, as it was in Confucian China. Significantly, Japanese language 
and speech patterns provide ample proof of hierarchical social relationships. For 
example, the Japanese make the distinction between giving to or receiving from 
a person of higher or lower rank or status in society in relationship to the 
speaker, and the Japanese (and in this case also the Chinese) have separate words 
for older and younger brothers or sisters. Within this hierarchical society, values 
and relationships that seem to predominate (perhaps because of the insularity, 
crowded environment, and homogeneity of the population) are "harmony" (wa), 
"civil formality" (tatemae)
, and dependency (amae). 
   The last concept was articulated in the mid-1950s by the eminent psycho-
analyst Dr. Doi Takeo (Doi, 1973). He proposed that amae was a key concept for 
understanding Japanese personality structure. Amae feeling is "to depend and
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presume upon another's benevolence." It is the feelings that all normal infants 
have toward the mother : dependence, the desire to be passively loved, the 
unwillingness to be separated from the warm mother-child circle and cast into a 
world of objective "reality." Put another way, amae is a dependency need which 
manifests itself in a longing to merge with others. This longing can be fulfilled 
under normal conditions in infancy, but it cannot be easily satisfied as one grows 
up. Yet the need for amae continues, and it is argued that this search for amae 
beyond infancy manifests itself in a variety of social conventions and char-
acteristics. 
   Dr. Doi followed his amae research, with a book-length study (Doi, 1986) of 
tatemae and honne (appearance and reality). Dr. Doi also ties tatemae to group 
harmony (wa). 
       Tatemae is a certain formal principle which is palatable to everybody 
   concerned so that the harmony of a group is guaranteed, while honne is the 
   feelings or opinions which they privately hold regarding the matter. (Doi, 
   1986, p. 159) (emphasis added) 
A less charitable American specialist on Japanese negotiating behavior (March, 
1988) called it "patient dissembling," "disdain for frankness," and "a refined 
tendency to call things by other names." 
   Amae, wa and tatemae lead to other characteristics, namely politeness, 
indirectness, avoidance of conflict, the use of intermediaries, silent pauses in 
conversation, and the ambiguity of the Japanese language-all of them very 
important for the negotiating process. 
   Twenty years after his articulation of the importance of amae, Dr. Doi linked 
it to the Japanese patterns of communication (Doi, 1973a). He posited that "all 
interpersonal communications in Japanese society have the emotional undertone 
of amae," and that many short breaks in Japanese conversation can be explained 
as feeling out one another and assessing the situation. He concluded that "what 
is most important for Japanese is to reassure themselves on every occasion of a 
mutuality based upon amae. Dr. Doi also talks about the ambiguity of the 
Japanese language, and the fact how little the Japanese communicate in 
international conferences. The ambiguity of the Japanese language is legendary. 
Lack of precision is, of course, wonderful for poetry, when a thought can trail off 
into nothingness, but it is not desirable for legal contracts. Is that one of the 
reasons why the Japanese prefer oral agreements to formal contracts? Let me 
quote again Dr. Doi (1973a, p. 183) : 
       Japanese communication is usually quite loose in logical connections. 
   You can go on talking for hours, even gracefully, without coming to the 
   point. That is why it is sometimes extremely difficult to render a Japanese
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   speech or article into English. 
   Finally, we should mention that the eminent anthropologist Ruth Benedict 
in her famous book on the Japanese character, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword 
(Benedict, 1946) s classified Japan as a "shame culture," in contrast to Western 
"guilt cultures." One of her conclusions was the dual nature of the Japanese, at 
once aesthetic and aggressive. Michael Blaker (1977) also sees duality in 
Japanese domestic ideals of conflict resolution : (1) harmonious cooperation or 
harmonious unity and (2) the warrior ethic. While Blaker was writing about 
diplomatic encounters, Japanese businesses often socialize their new employees 
in a boot camp atmosphere, and competition in international trade is treated as 
trade wars. No wonder, then, that American businessmen see their Japanese 
counterparts' behavior as a continuation of the samurai spirit. See, for example, 
the publication in English of the famous work, The Book of Five Rings [Gorin no 
Sho] of a seventeenth century masterless samurai Miyamoto Musashi (Miyamoto, 
1982), with the subtitle The Real Art of Japanese Management and A Guide to 
Winning Strategy ; or David Rogers' (Rogers, 1984) Fighting to Win : Samurai 
Techniques for Your Work and Life.
Russian Culture 
   Dual nature-although is this case passive and violent-is likewise ascribed 
by anthropologists to Russia. Although some Russian historians have noted 
dualities in Russian character, the British anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer (Gorer 
& Rickman, 1949) had related the long periods in Russian history of calm and 
fatalistic acceptance of oppression punctured by short violent rebellions and 
upheavals to the manner in which Russian infants are being brought up. The 
swaddling of infants is the metaphor of behavior. The Russian baby is swaddled 
in such a way that for long stretches of time he is completely denied freedom of 
motion and he learns to accept this unquestionably. But when the infant is 
unswaddled, he begins to express his frustration in violent movements. 
   In the case of Communist and post-Communist societies (China and Russia), 
however, there is another duality involving the tension between the society's 
historical traditions and the imposed Marxist dogma and Leninist practice. In 
shorthand fashion, one used to ask, "Are the Soviets Russian Communists, or 
Russian Communists ? Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as a loyal Slavophile, sees 
present-day Russia's problems solely in terms of its recent disastrous three-
quarter century experience with Communism. Western observers, on the other 
hand, see much continuity between Tsarist authoritarian pathologies and 
aggressive foreign policy and its Soviet successor state. Many see Josef Stalin's 
ruthlessness and industrialization as a continuation of Ivan the Terrible and of
184
Culture-Communication -Negotiation
Peter the Great's Europeanization or modernization.' 
   Invasions of Russia through the ages, from the Mongols to Hitler (what Leon 
Sloss and Scott Davis [1987] call "the burden of a painful history") have created 
in the Russian psyche deep feelings of insecurity, inferiority (covered up by 
assertions of superiority), and extreme suspiciousness. Hence, Russian and 
Soviet negotiators have insisted on being treated as a superpower, and on terms 
of equality with the United States.
Chinese Culture 
   The same dichotomy between Russian Tsarist history and its recent 
Communist experiment is, of course, still present in China. And the continuity of 
Tsarist authoritarianism, degenerating into Stalinist totalitarianism, is true 
mutatis mutandis of China. It has been often observed that traditional China was 
a "Government of Men" instead of a "Government of Laws." Lucian Pye, an 
authority on Chinese politics, in discussing cultural differences between China 
and the United States, makes a related point that "Chinese culture traditionally 
shuns legal considerations and instead stresses ethical and moralist principles, 
where Americans are thought to be highly legalistic (Pye, 1992, p. 23). At the 
same time, it should be noted that in spite of elections and parliaments, 
Communist Leninist states, such as China and the Soviet Union, are (or were) in 
the Western sense lawless societies. 
   When one watched the first revolutionary Chinese leaders, such as Mao Tse-
tung and Chou En-lai, it was clear that in spite of being Marxists-Leninists, they 
were also imbued with the Middle Kingdom spirit, i. e proud of the millennia of 
China's history and its central ("Center of the Universe") role in East Asia. But 
along with pride, their generation of Chinese were also keenly aware of the one 
hundred years of humiliation that befell China after the disastrous Opium War 
with Britain in the mid-nineteenth century. Since Hong Kong was lost at that 
time, one can understand the feelings of present-day Chinese leaders as they are 
about to regain sovereignty over that British colonial outpost in the summer of 
1997. 
   Thus, Chinese culture and history combined with Marxist-Leninist mores is 
what influences the Chinese negotiator.
The Culture of Leninist States 
   At its height, the international Communist movement consisted of a dozen 
ruling states and almost a hundred nonruling Communist parties around the 
world. In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union was the unquestioned leader, but less 
than a decade later Communist China went its own way and the international
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Communist movement splintered along the Moscow-Peking poles, with some 
independents, like Yugoslavia and a few Communist parties in the Free World, 
attempting to maintain distance between the two Communist superstates. The 
ruling Communist states (officially they called themselves socialist on the way to 
Communism) shared many characteristics, the chief among them being the fact 
that they were ruled by Leninist parties that controlled almost every political, 
economic, social, and cultural institution. These parties had a monopoly of 
power and control over all communications : personal, print, broadcasting. As 
mentioned above, present-day Chinese and Russian senior policymakers are (or 
were) Communist Party functionaries who were socialized in a Leninist state 
culture. 
   It should also be noted that in spite of the Marxist dogma about the primacy 
of economics, in reality, politics is all-pervasive in all Leninist societies. Thus, 
misunderstandings arise among Western negotiators who believe that politics, 
economics, and social relations occupy separate realms, and fail to realize the all-
pervasive impact of politics on all aspects of life in Leninist party-states.
Claims of Cultural Uniqueness and Exceptionalism 
   Claims of cultural uniqueness are not unique. The Japanese persistently talk 
about the uniqueness of their culture, and in the heyday of their militarism and 
imperialism, they proclaimed the doctrine of Hakko Ichiu, "The Four Corners of 
the World Under One [Japanese] Roof." The Chinese have claimed cultural 
superiority for millennia. Though the Jews consider themselves "The Chosen 
People," they have competition from the British and also from the Japanese 
(where one sect actually believed that the Japanese are the Ten Lost Tribes). The 
French proudly promote their "Mission civilisatrice." The Russians point to the 
impenetrable Russian soul and the fact that certain Russian words and phrases 
defy translation into foreign languages. In addition to uniqueness, the Russians 
have also been imbued with messianism. In Tsarist times, the slogan was that 
"Moscow is the Third Rome [after Rome and Constantinopl
e] and there shall 
never be a fourth one." The fact that Russia was the first country in the world 
to have established a Marxist-Leninist regime, seems only to have contributed to 
the Russian sense of uniqueness and mission. Last, but not least, the Americans 
have claimed "Manifest Destiny" and "exceptionalism" for their history and 
mission." 
   Proclaimers of uniqueness or cultural superiority, however, can be divided 
into two groups : some peoples have quiet confidence, accept their cultural 
superiority as an article of faith, while others are not quite sure. This is 
particularly true of Japan, an island nation, that has produced a magnificent
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culture and that both prides itself on its uniqueness and is somewhat unsure of 
these claims. Otherwise, why would there be so many books and articles on the 
Japanese character (Nihonjin ron) ? 12 The Russians, another talented people, 
proclaim their superiority and at the same time exhibit doubts about it ; why do 
they have the need to insist that almost everything in the world was invented by 
them ? 13 The French seem to be firm believers in the superiority of French 
language and culture. So are the Chinese. 
   Why should there be such a difference between "unique" countries? My 
feeling is that "soft" believers, like the Japanese and the Russians have been 
cultural borrowers. In addition, both peoples exhibit a sense of insecurity and 
vulnerability : Russia has been periodically invaded and Japan is poor in natural 
resources. Does this have an effect on the way the Russians and the Japanese 
negotiate compared to the Chinese, the French, the Anglo-Saxons? I believe 
there is a difference in that the Chinese, for example, have a vision, while the 
Japanese get bogged down in obsessive details. The Russians are by nature 
suspicious, while the Japanese are terribly afraid of losing face and also tend to 
panic toward the end of negotiations (see the section on Negotiations, below). 
   Henry Kissinger (1994, p. 142) perceptively compares Russian and American 
exceptionalism in a way that seems partially to corroborate my theory : 
       The openness of each country's frontiers was among the few common 
   features of American and Russian exceptionalism. America's sense of 
   uniqueness was based on the concept of liberty ; Russia's sprang from the 
   experience of common suffering. Everyone was eligible to share in 
   America's values ; Russia's were available only to the Russian nation, to the 
   exclusion of most of its non-Russian subjects. America's exceptionalism led 
   it to isolationism alternating with occasional moral crusades ; Russia's 
   evoked a sense of mission which often led to military adventures. 
DECISIONMAKING PROCESS 
   It is essential for negotiators to know their opposite number's decision-
making process. In totalitarian countries most major decisions were made either 
by a strong top leader like Josef Stalin or Mao Tse-tung, or by a small self-
perpetuating oligarchy, whether by the Politburo, or on important national 
security occasions by a smaller subcommittee of the Politburo. In present day 
Russia, the final decision is made by President Boris Yeltsin himself, or in 
consultation with a small coterie, often members of the extra-constitutional 
Security Council. 
   Japan is a special case of a society that eschews strong leadership. In fact, 
whenever a strong leader would appear, like the early postwar Prime Minister 
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Yoshida Shigeru, he was pejoratively called Wanman ("One Man") Yoshida. 
Normally, the country is run by consensus emanating from below, and some 
political scientists have opined that there is no power at the center. Interest-
ingly, the Director General of The International Research Center for Japanese 
Studies, the noted Jungian analyst Dr. Kawai Hayao (Kawai, 1985) in his analysis 
of Japanese mythology, suggested over a decade ago that in contrast to the 
Western "Central Power Ruled Model," Japan can be characterized as a "Hollow 
Center Balanced Model."" 
   As a result, the locus of decisionmaking in Japan (whether in politics or in 
business) is not at the top, but in the middle. It is upper middle officialdom or 
management where different options are threshed out, leading to a consensus 
decision which is then sent up the chain of command where approval is 
generally proforma. This process of decisionmaking by consensus is called Ringi 
kessai, after the document Ringisho which is stamped with the seal of each 
person who is on the list. The advantage of this process is that everyone who 
affixes his seal shares in the responsibility for the decision. This process of 
consultation is akin to binding the roots of a tree before transplantation and is 
called Nemawashi (literally, "tying the roots"). Building a consensus is, of ne-
cessity, a slow process, and this affects any changes or concessions that might be 
offered during negotiations.
MAN VERSUS ENVIRONMENT 
   Many Japanese observers take it to be virtually axiomatic that there is a 
basic incompatibility between American and Japanese negotiators. The noted 
Japanese political scientist Mushakoji Kinhide (Mushakoji, in Japanese, 1967; in 
English, 1976) believes that this basic incompatibility derives from a funda-
mental philosophical difference in views about the relationship between humans 
and their environment. He juxtaposes the American erabi style and the Japanese 
awase style. The American style (choosing, can-do, or "manipulative") is 
grounded in the belief that "man can freely manipulate his environment for his 
own purposes." The Japanese style ("adaptive"), on the other hand, "rejects the 
idea that man can manipulate the environment. I would even go further and 
state that a Japanese not only adjusts to the environment ; he becomes at one 
with it-a form of symbiotic harmony. From this Japanese attitude follow 
appeals to past obligation and requests for present favor (see discussions of amae 
dependency elsewhere in this chapter) Japanese acceptance of the environment 
in my view stems from vulnerabilities caused by frequent natural disasters in a 
land of poor resources. 
   Inasmuch as Marxism-Leninism is an ideology of progress, overcoming
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nature's obstacles and adapting nature to the requirements of a modern society 
is an article of faith among Communists. Many of the numerous five-year-plans 
in both the Soviet Union and Communist China included ambitious, "the largest 
in the world" schemes to harness hydroelectric power (the latest being China's 
current ecologically precarious plan to dam the Yangtze River), and other types 
of manipulating nature (canals between river systems, reversing the flow of 
rivers, massive irrigation projects and the like). 
   In traditional Chinese view, Man could be in harmony with Nature. The 
Chinese needed water for irrigation and from time to time had to control floods. 
The principle here was that if you wanted to transform Nature, you had better 
work with Nature. There was no need for Man to adjust to Nature in the manner 
of the Japanese. The Russians, by contrast, were in an inferior position toward 
Nature, as they had to live in harsh climatic conditions in their vast land.
COMMUNICATION
   At the outset, a few brief comments on communication might be useful." 
First, communication is a symbolic activity, and therefore it includes nonverbal 
displays (see below), as well as objects, such as the flag. Second, communication 
is a process involving encoding (so that thoughts, feelings, emotions, or attitudes 
are in a form recognizable by others) and decoding (perceiving and interpreting 
incoming messages and stimuli from the environment). Third, communication is 
transactional (interactive), meaning that the people with whom we communicate 
have an impact on us and we have an impact on them. Fourth, communication 
takes place at varying levels of awareness (both consciously and unconsciously, 
see the section on Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Approach, above). 
Incidentally, we are more aware of our behavior with people from other cultures 
than with our own people, but at the same time we have to interpret the behavior 
of negotiators from other cultures. Fifth, intention is not a necessary condition 
for communication, for as Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson have postulated : 
"one cannot not communicate" (Watzlawick et al., 1967, p. 51). (In negotiations, 
one constantly communicates, even before the first verbal exchanges.) Sixth, 
every communication has two dimensions : a content (what is said) dimension and 
a relationship (how it is said) dimension. The relationship dimension is usually 
encoded and decoded unconsciously. The content dimension is usually encoded 
verbally, while the relationship dimension tends to be encoded nonverbally, and 
therefore vitally important to the negotiating process. I would also add that in 
psychoanalytic terminology one distinguishes manifest content (what is actually 
said) from latent content (what is thought but not communicated, or what re-
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mains in the unconscious), while the affect shows how the message is communi-
cated.
COMMUNICATION CHANNELS 
   One of the most striking distinctions among communication patterns is the 
role and quantity of non-verbal communication. One can distinguish the follow-
ing five channels of communication that carry as much or more information 
than verbal exchange alone." And, of course, each culture uses these channels in 
its own unique way. 
   Occulesics is related to the use or avoidance of eye-to-eye contact during 
conversation. Americans, for example, are more dependent on direct eye contact 
as a sign of active listening, and often sincerity. They may feel that without eye 
contact they are "out of contact" with the other person. In other cultures, staring 
at the other person may be an act of impoliteness, or even challenge that can lead 
to unpleasant consequences. 
   Hepatics is related to the degree, if any, of touch (or tactile contact) in the 
process of communication. When Europeans and Americans meet, they usually 
shake hands, Latin Americans may embrace, others may kiss or touch cheeks 
(one, two, or three times), while still others, like the Japanese, simply bow (how 
deeply depends on the social standing of the parties), avoiding physical contact 
altogether. 
   Kinesics is related to the movement of hands, head, torso, etc. as amplifiers 
of messages, both verbal and non-verbal, or on occasion even to deliver con-
tradictory signals. For example, the Japanese constantly nod during conver-
sation, signifying the fact that they heard the message, but not necessarily 
expressing agreement. This has confused countless foreign counterparts in 
negotiations, as does the Japanese practice to answer a negative question with a 
"yes" and perhaps a nod
, but which signifies a "no" in terms of substance. 
   Proxemics is related to personal space, or "comfort zone" in the act of com-
munication. While in some cultures, getting close to other party's face may 
signify sincerity, in ours it is considered an invasion of our "private" space, and 
may trigger a public negative response. 
   Chronemics is related to the timing of verbal exchange, "turn taking," pauses, 
silences, and interruptions during conversation. Oriental people generally are 
quite comfortable with silences, and do not feel obligated to "take turns," while 
Occidentals (especially Americans) expect "turn taking," feel uncomfortable 
when the other party does not respond and proceed with their presentation, 
occasionally feeling the need to make unnecessary concessions. Time can also be 
divided into monochronic and polychronic. 
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NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION 
   To a certain extent, all humans communicate both verbally and non-
verbally. But being a homogeneous society in crowded circumstances, the 
Japanese more than others have learned to communicate with each other in 
shorthand fashion and even without words. Such non-verbal communication is 
known in Japan as haragei (the art of communicating through your body-
literally "stomach" or what we in the West call gut feelings). Here is how a 
Japanese author (Matsumoto in McCreary, 1986, p. 58) describes Haragei : (1) Be 
euphemistic, eschewing logic or reason ; (2) Keep the message vague and am-
biguous ; (3) Be empathetic ; (4) Don't publicly disagree ; (5) Don't be legalistic ; (6) 
Play it artistically and wholeheartedly ; (7) Don't attract attention ; (8) Don't 
come on strong ; (9) Don't seek the truth ; (10) Don't tell the truth ; (11) Let silence 
talk and language be silent. 
   Significantly, when the Japanese negotiate with the Chinese, they claim that 
the two peoples are Dobun doshu (same script and same kind), referring to the 
common use of Chinese characters and sharing the same racial characteristics. 
Hence, when communicating the two can understand each other without words.
LET SILENCE TALK AND LANGUAGE BE SILENT 
   As Matsumoto Michihiro phrases it, silence is the most important "com-
ponent" of non-verbal communication. In terms of talkativeness-the other 
extreme of silence-the Americans are clearly at one end of the spectrum and the 
Japanese on the other, with the Chinese somewhere in between. In fact, some 
inexperienced American businessmen mistook Japanese silence as a rejection of 
their offers, and proceeded to lower their price. Silence can be a pause in 
conversation or speech can be a break between silences. According to Raymond 
Smith (1989) who had extensive experience in negotiating with the Soviets, 
Americans emphasize content and slight context. They share facts but guard 
emotions, and focus on words. The Soviets do the opposite : they guard facts and 
focus on the pauses.
POLITENESS/RUDENESS 
   In terms of the negotiators attitudes, there is a huge distinction between the 
Japanese on the one hand, and Chinese and Soviet negotiators on the other, as if 
they were at opposite poles. The Japanese negotiators are invariably polite, and 
will do everything to keep the negotiations in a civil atmosphere. (We are not 
talking here about wartime experiences. In early 1942, General Yamashita 
Tomoyuki asked for the unconditional surrender of British forces in Singapore, 
with a simple demand : "Yes ka, No ka ?")
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   At the height of the Cold War, a Chinese negotiator habitually called his 
American counterpart "a capitalist crook, rapist, thief, robber of widows, stealer 
of pennies from the eyes of the dead, mongrel of uncertain origin," charged 
President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles with 
murder and ended his tirade by accusing the American diplomat that "he had 
blood on his hands and was a murderer lying in the gutter with filthy garbage" 
(Steibel, 1972, p. 29).17 
   The Soviet negotiators, in stark contrast to the Japanese, used rudeness as a 
tool to put the other side on the defensive. As for present-day Russian 
negotiators, we should remember that most of the diplomats not only were 
socialized under the Soviet regime but who also grew up in a society where 
elementary norms of civility were lacking. 
                     NEGOTIATION
THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
   Broadly speaking, the negotiation process can be divided into the Pre-
negotiation stage, the Negotiation itself, and the Post-negotiation stage. The 
Negotiation stage can be, in turn, divided into three phases : the first phase of 
assessment, the second or middle phase of bargaining and concession-making, 
and the third and final phase of closure. 
General Characteristics and Approaches 
   As a broad generalization, it might be worth mentioning that several 
authors have commented that Chinese negotiators are closer to Western 
negotiators than they are to Japanese negotiators and that Professor Kimura 
Hiroshi (Kimura, 1980) has concluded that neither the Japanese nor Russians 
have as yet adopted the Western notion of negotiation. 
   In approaching negotiations the Chinese, Japanese, and the Russians all 
seem to be more serious, tight, and skeptical than the Americans. The Chinese, 
the Japanese, and the old Soviets also seem to be more single-minded and 
disciplined than the American negotiators, although it is probable that the post-
Soviet Russians may be lees so, especially in the business sphere. Group 
dependence again seems to separate the Americans from the Chinese, Japanese, 
or the Soviets/Russians. The Japanese negotiators are extremely fearful of 
losing face. The Soviet/Russian negotiator is suspicious, if not paranoid, looking 
over his shoulder as if somebody out there is out to cheat him. This sense of 
insecurity, while understandable in the light of Russian history, does not 
facilitate a business-like and congenial negotiating atmosphere. 
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PRE-NEGOTIATION STAGE 
   The pre-negotiation stage includes a commitment to negotiation and 
arranging the conference. Here each side defines the problem and develops 
negotiation strategies, including how to arrange the venue, agenda, and rules in 
one's favor. Each side may also engage in a pre-conference propaganda 
campaign (as was almost de rigueur in the case of Communist negotiators) or 
threatening behavior. Here the Chinese strategy of "Kill the chicken to scare the 
monkey," i. e., to take action against a weak antagonist to warn the stronger 
ones, comes to mind. For example, when the Dutch government sold some 
weapons to Taiwan, the Chinese government on the mainland took drastic 
action against the Dutch, to warn the major arms suppliers like the United States 
or France. Chinese propaganda campaign may also include proclamation of 
some "Non-Negotiable Principle." 
   All three negotiating teams (Chinese, Japanese, and Soviet/Russian) engage 
in a lot of preparatory work, with the Japanese being the most methodical. 
Collection of information for its own sake is a characteristic of the Japanese, 
dating back to the self-imposed seclusion in the seventeenth century, if not 
earlier when Japan was culturally dependent upon China. If fact, some observers 
have commented that the Japanese general trading companies (sogo shosha) 
could compete with the CIA and other major intelligence organizations in the 
quantity of information in their files. This abundance of information probably 
redounds to the benefit of the Japanese negotiators in trade and other economic 
matters.
Venue and Agenda/Rules 
   It is obvious that controlling the venue of negotiations and the agenda (and 
accompanying rules) provides great advantages. The Japanese on the whole do 
not actively and persistently seek these advantages. To a certain extent they are 
protected by a tradition of international rotation schedules. For example, the 
Group of Seven (G-7) annual summits follow a strict rotation schedule, though 
Japan was not selected for the first several conference sites. By contrast, the 
Communist negotiators would not only go to great lengths to assure themselves 
the advantages that come from controlling the venue and agenda, but would 
engage in lengthy negotiations to control such details of the negotiating process 
as the shape of the table (North Vietnamese vs. Henry Kissinger in Paris in the 
early 1970s). One high-ranking American negotiator went so far as to state that 
in the Soviet view (and by extension other Communists) form is substance. The 
Americans on occasion give up even negotiating about the venue, as happened 
during Kissinger's preliminary negotiations with Chou En-lai in 1971. One
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wonders why the American President Richard Nixon had to travel to Peking in 
February 1972, emulating the historical role of barbarians paying tribute to the 
Son of Heaven, and not insisting on a neutral site?
NEGOTIATION'S FIRST PHASE: ASSESSMENT 
   The first phase of actual negotiations is a period of assessment, of getting to 
know and sizing up the opposite number, of making the opening moves, and 
developing possible scenarios toward reaching a satisfactory conclusion.
Getting to Know the Opposite Number 
   Of the three cases presented in this chapter, the Soviet negotiators seemed to 
have cared the least in terms of getting to know their opposite numbers. In fact, 
we might say that one of their favorite tactics was the use of invective, not the 
best way to win friends and influence people. During the Cold War period (and 
especially during and after the "hot war" on the Korean peninsula), the Chinese 
diplomats also engaged in virtuosic ad hominem attacks. But during more 
normal times, the Chinese are bent on cultivating relations with their opposite 
numbers for a specific purpose of later using "old friends" to extract concessions. 
(In the Chinese tradition "friendship" implies obligations.) This practice is so 
pervasive, that Lucian Pye (1992), Richard Solomon (1985; 1987), and Alfred 
Wilhelm (1994) who wrote extensively on negotiating with the Chinese, spe-
cifically warn American negotiators not to fall into this trap. 
   Another element in this practice is the Chinese concept of guanxi, a kind of 
special relationship, with undertones of dependency. This, of course, brings 
memories of Japanese amae dependency (discussed in greater detail below), but 
also of Japanese obligations and reciprocals of on, gimu, and giri, articulated by 
Ruth Benedict (1946). Japanese negotiators are very sensitive to Chinese 
overtures for special relationship and usually resist them. On the other hand, 
Japanese negotiators will generally invest a good deal of time to build a trust-
worthy relationship, before they would venture to talk business.
Opening Moves 
   In opening diplomatic negotiations, it is customary to make a tour d'horizon, 
a kind of grand survey of the world situation. During the Communist period, 
Soviet negotiators usually engaged in haranging the capitalist and imperialist 
systems. As for the Chinese and Japanese, the former are far more attuned to a 
broad, overall approach than the Japanese, who tend to focus on the issues at 
hand. No wonder, then, that Henry Kissinger praised Chou En-lai's broad vision, 
while Charles De Gaulle pictured a visiting Japanese prime minister as a
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transistor salesman. It is only fair to add that President George Bush once 
appeared in Tokyo with the presidents of the American Big Three automakers, 
putting himself in the position of an automobile salesman. 
   A common characteristic of both Communist Chinese and Soviet negotiators 
is the insistence on developing an "agreement in principle," which can later be 
used as a weapon or an argument against specific proposals by the other side.
Expectations of Amae Dependency 
   Ambassador Kitamura Hiroshi (Kitamura, 1971) was the first Japanese 
diplomat to note that amae psychology has played a very important role in 
Japanese-American relations. He argues that the Japanese feel that because the 
United States is more powerful than Japan, it should-to a certain extent-
indulge them : "The unbalanced relationship between Japan and the United 
States is ... highly conducive to initiating an amae psychology." And when the 
American behavior in negotiations did not gratify or satisfy the Japanese desire 
for amae, this would in turn produce frustration and hostile attitudes on the part 
of the Japanese. 
   But did Japanese perceptions of and attitudes toward the United States 
change as the power relationship between the two countries changed over time? 
And was there, therefore, a corresponding decline in amae expectations? In a 
recent article, Ambassador Kitamura (1994) sadly notes that despite consid-
erable rise in status, the Japanese still seem to harbor feelings of amae toward 
America, perhaps in a different guise. Yet no signs have emerged that Japan was 
getting to a position where she could dispense some amae to the United States. 
Unhappily, I think that Japan is essentially comfortable receiving amae. One 
should mention, however, that many younger Japanese diplomats do not have 
feelings of amae toward their American counterparts and furthermore are aware 
that amae does not work with the Americans.18 
   Of course, amae feelings are not unique to Japanese diplomacy. One can 
argue that in the Anglo-American English speaking so-called "special relation-
ship," the British expect special treatment (amae ?) from the United States. 
Soviet and now Russian diplomats have used the arguments that geographically 
Russia lacks natural defenses and the country has been constantly invaded 
throughout its history (the Mongols, Swedes, Poles, Napoleon, the Allied 
intervention after World War I, Hitler). They conveniently fail to mention that 
the Soviet Union invaded half a dozen Central and East European countries and 
colonized the three Baltic states during or in the aftermath of World War II. The 
Soviet/Russian diplomats also seek sympathy by invoking the twenty-eight 
million sacrificed in that great conflict. And now the Russians plead under-
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development and difficulties in their transition from command to market 
economy. The Chinese use similar arguments that economically developed 
"rich" countries should show more understanding and be prepared to make 
concessions to "developing" countries like China, as well as provide help in 
facilitating China's entry into international economic organizations.
NEGOTIATION'S SECOND OR MIDDLE PHASE: BARGAINING AND 
CONCESSION-MAKING 
   This is the main part of the negotiating process and many of the char-
acteristics of different cultural groups are exhibited here in their fullest. But 
before one gets into bargaining, the two sides must present their opening 
positions, and there is often a dance in terms of who initiates the first step. The 
Chinese are particularly adept at withholding their opening bid until the other 
side has committed itself to their opening position. In Peking, for example, the 
Chinese would invite the other side, as guests to start, while in Washington they 
would expect the hosts to show their cards. 
   In the middle phase, the Soviets have used threats and other pressure tactics, 
such as propaganda campaigns addressed at world opinion ; the Chinese attempt 
to shame, play adversaries against each other ; while the Japanese will typically 
dig in and keep repeating their position. Parties may play the "good cop-bad 
cop" routine, demand recesses or intermediaries, and test the patience of their 
counterparts. While the Japanese have generally outlasted Western negotiators 
by slowing down tactics, they have been no match for the Chinese who would on 
occasion simply stonewall (Ogura, 1979).
NEGOTIATION'S THIRD PHASE: CLOSURE OR END GAME 
   The end of the negotiating process may involve a decision to 
negotiations, put them on hold, or come to some sort of a conclusion. 
may involve last minute activities, including :
break ff 
The latter
Eleventh Hour Concessions 
   Both Chinese and Japanese negotiators often wait until the last minute 
before offering meaningful concessions to the other side. Michael Blaker entitled 
his chapter on the Japanese negotiating style "Probe, Push, and Panic" (1973) to 
describe Japanese tactics. (He added "Postpone" in his chapter in this volume.) 
In a June 1996 television interview with U. S. Trade Representative Charlene 
Barshefsky (Barshefsky, 1996), Paul Solman, economics reporter for the Public 
Broadcasting Service (PBS) Newshour with Jim Lehrer, asked if negotiations 
with China are "always this kind of a cat-and-mouse game : we have to threaten
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sanctions, go down to the last minute ?" Barshefsky replied that "This is an 
unfortunate cycle, but it seems the only cycle that the Chinese have responded to 
with respect to implementation of trade agreements." Asked if this was also the 
case with the Japanese, the Trade Representative replied that this was not the 
case in every agreement with the Japanese. But in the case of China, she 
confirmed that 
      if you look at the history with China, all agreements came about after 
   months and months of education, consultation, negotiations, but only at the 
   end of the day after sanctions have been threatened. This is a pernicious 
   cycle, but not one that the United States has created, and it is one to which 
   the Chinese seem to respond.
POST-NEGOTIATION STAGE: IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS AND 
REOPENING OF POST-AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS 
   The Soviet record is mixed: they have scrupulously and faithfully adhered 
to payments schedules (realizing that loss of credit would dry up future sources), 
while at the same time cheating on agreements involving national security 
matters. (The controversial Krasnoyarsk radar station built in contravention of 
an agreement with the United States to limit ABM systems to Moscow is one 
such example.) The present Russian record in adhering to commercial agree-
ments is not very good, corner cutting being the order of the day. The Japanese, 
very much lacking in strong principles and believing in situational ethics, are 
likely to attempt to re-negotiate agreements if the circumstances have dras-
tically changed. In negotiating with the Chinese, Americans have found out that 
no matter what agreement is reached, it may be subject to review and objection 
by some higher-up not present at the conference. The Chinese also have the 
unsavory reputation of bringing up new demands after the conclusion of 
negotiations.
CONCLUSIONS
   This chapter stresses the importance of the impact of different national 
communication patterns upon the process and outcome of negotiations as a 
distinct, intermediary influence, apart from the cultural traits that condition the 
actions of the decisionmakers and actors in the process of negotiation. In this 
regard, I have emphasized the importance of non-verbal communication and 
different channels of such communication (occulesics, hepatics, kinesics, prox-
emics, and chronemics). In addition, I have stressed the advantages of the 
comparative method, whether in the analysis of culture, communication
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patterns, or the negotiating process. In comparing cultures, I have found that it 
is not enough to examine elements of Japanese, Chinese, and Russian cultures, 
and I have added a category of "The Culture of Leninist States." After all, since 
Russia experienced three-quarters of a century and China half a century of all 
pervasive control exercized by Leninist parties, in effect they were or are 
Leninist party-states. Likewise, it is highly desirable not to limit analysis to the 
conscious motives of the negotiating actors and their superiors, but to delve into 
the unconscious mechanisms operant in group psychology and in individual 
defense mechanisms. Included in this psychoanalytic domain are specific no-
tions of identification, projection, and projective identification. The psycho-
analytic and psychodynamic approach can significantly enrich our analysis of 
the entire negotiation process, beginning with the pre-negotiation stage and 
ending with the post-negotiation stage and problems associated with the 
implementation of the agreements. 
   Of the different cultures, communication patterns, and negotiation styles 
discussed in this paper, the Japanese seem to be the one closest to being unique. 
In fact, Professor John Graham, a contributor to this volume and a student of 
comparative negotiating behavior in two dozen cultures, once remarked that if 
Americans are at one end of the spectrum, the Japanese are surely at the other 
end." The empirical study (cited above) rank ordering communication patterns 
in accordance with their high-context/low-context also found the Japanese at 
the very end of the spectrum, with the United States toward the other end, 
though not at the extreme end. Other comparative studies have found Chinese 
negotiators to be closer to Western counterparts than to the Japanese, and 
neither Japanese nor Russian negotiators seem to have adopted the Western 
notions of negotiation. 
   Claims of cultural uniqueness are not unique. Many peoples claim 
uniqueness or cultural superiority, including the Chinese, Japanese, Russians, 
French, the Anglo-Saxons, to name a few. But these peoples can be divided into 
two groups : those who accept their cultural superiority as an article of faith, and 
those who are not quite sure. I put the Japanese and the Russians in the second 
category because both peoples have been cultural borrowers and both seem to 
exhibit a sense of insecurity and vulnerability. I argue that, as a result, there are 
differences in negotiating styles between the first and second groups. The 
negotiators from the first group seem to have more confidence and a broader 
vision, while those in the second group harbor more suspicion and are afraid to 
lose face. 
   In terms of culture stability, again Japan takes the top honors, with both 
China and Russia showing signs of transition : China trying to accommodate a
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Leninist political system with an evolving modified market economic system, 
and Russia jettisonning both the totalitarian political system and the command 
economic system. Whatever the final destination of these changes in both China 
and Russia, the cultural milieu is bound to undergo changes. 
   In describing cultures, many authors have stressed the dualities and 
contradictory attributes, whether the aesthetic/aggressive nature of the 
Japanese, or the passive/violent nature of the Russians. Equally important, it 
seems to me, is to emphasize the effects of the Communist experiment with all its 
pernicious impact on Russian and Chinese societies. These societies today show 
that while some of the Communist policies reinforced prerevolutionary trends, 
others created discontinuities with the past. It would take a post-Communist 
period of some length for some kind of a synthesis to emerge, to borrow Marxist/ 
Hegelian terminology. In the meantime, the Chinese or Russian negotiator is 
bound to exhibit a dual character. 
   The Japanese explicit and implicit pleadings of amae dependency have 
related parallels in Russia and China, where arguments are made during 
negotiations to evoke sympathies. In Russia, this usually takes the form of 
reminding the negotiating partners that Russia was always forced to fight off 
invaders and pleading human suffering and almost thirty million casualties in 
World War II. In China, this can take the form of cajoling and manipulating "old 
friends," persons with prior experience in China or dealings with the Chinese, as 
well as pleading underdevelopment to obtain preferential treatment. 
   It is hoped that this effort of presenting conceptual frameworks for the 
study of culture-communication-negotiation, illustrated by selective exam-
ples from the national characteristics of Japan, China, and the Soviet Union/ 
Russia would provide deeper insights into these complex subjects.
NOTES
* This chapter is dedicated to the memory of my mentor Professor Philip E. Mosely, former 
  Director of the Russian (now Harriman) Institute, Columbia University, who himself wrote the 
  first significant account of Soviet negotiating techniques (Mosely, 1951). 
  I wish to thank Paul Langer for reading a preliminary draft of this chapter and offering many 
  helpful criticisms, and Joan Lachkar for helping me formulate psychoanalytic and psycho-
  dynamic perspectives. Needless to say, all responsibility remains mine alone. 
1. Now, for obvious reasons renamed Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 
2. When I heard the most senior South Korean negotiator describe his dealings with his North 
  Korean counterparts, I was reminded of the generic "Communist" negotiators. And the South 
  Korean statesman was unable to identify specific "Korean" characteristics of the North Korean 
  negotiating team.
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 3. Here I follow the definitions of Dr. Joan Lachkar (1992). 
 4. Geert Hofstede delineates five dimensions of culture : (1) power distance, (2) collectivism vs. 
    individualism, (3) femininity vs. masculinity, (4) uncertainty avoidance, and (5) long-term 
    orientation. 
 5. John Graham of the School of Management at the University of California at Irvine (and a 
    contributor to this volume) in his study of comparative negotiation styles distinguishes 
    between northern and southern Chinese. There are, of course, also numerous national 
    minorities in China, such as Tibetans, Mongols, Uighurs, and Kazakhs. 
 6. This section on Japan's culture follows closely the section on "Japanese Cultural Charac-
    teristics" in my previous work on Japanese negotiating behavior (Berton, 1996) 
 7. Japanese names are given in Japanese style, surname first, followed by the given name. 
    It is common knowledge that Yamamoto wrote the book on the Japanese and the Jews using the 
    pseudonym of Isaiah BenDasan, so that it would appear that the book (BenDasan, 1971) had 
    been written by a Sephardi Jew long resident in Japan. 
 8. It should be noted, however, that not all scholars accept the model of Japan as a harmonious and 
    group-oriented society. See Befu, 1980. 
 9. In a recent study of Ruth Benedict's archives, Pauline Kent (1994) discovered that the original 
    Report 25, which was later expanded into the famous book, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 
    does not include, to any significant extent, discussions of Japan as a "shame culture." Curiously, 
    the subsequent addition of the "shame culture" concept became the dominant theme of 
    Benedict's book. 
10. A third duality was the difference between Russia's European and Asian policies. In the West, 
    Imperial Russia often behaved in the context of the Concert of Europe. The Asiatic Department, 
    responsible for Russian policy toward the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, and the Far East, often 
    acted independently and aggressively (Kissinger, 1994). 
    Post-Soviet Russia has experienced a split between the "Atlanticists" and the "Eurasianists" 
    (Kimura, 1996). This arises from the duality of Russia as a state facing both Europe and Asia, 
    and symbolized by the Two-Headed Eagle in the Tsarist Coat of Arms. 
    Another useful way of tackling the Russian cultural dimension is to present a set of American 
    and Russian mutual stereotypes, and both positive and negative images of each other collected 
    by Robert Anderson and Petr Shikhirev (Anderson and Shikhirev, 1994, pp. 99 and 108). 
    Russian Stereotype of Americans : people like us, but more successful and who are ahead of us, 
    and from whom we have to learn market relations and democracy. 
    American Stereotype of Russians : bunglers, mafiosi, nouveau riche, and troublemakers. 
    Russian Positive Images of Americans : 
    Energy, practicality, efficiency, organization, responsibility, easy to get along, ability to seek 
    compromises. 
    Russian Negative Images of Americans : 
    Stinginess, poor knowledge of Russia and Russian culture (especially language), limited 
    outlook, paternalistic attitude toward Russian partners, suspiciousness and distrust. 
    American Positive Images of Russians : 
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   High intellectual potential and education, inventiveness and imagination, desire to learn, 
   dependability in friendly relations, warmth, sociability. 
   American Negative Images of Russians : 
   Disorganization (lack of discipline), low level of business culture, quickness to take offense, 
   confusing personal and business relations, daydreaming ("on cloud nine"), promises are not 
   thought through, inclination toward dependency, weak initiative. 
11. The latest book on the subject is by Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism : A 
  Double-edged Sword (1996) 
12. Some fifteen years ago the Nomura Research Institute compiled a list of 700 titles published 
   since 1945. See Befu, 1980. 
   For an original position that the Japanese society cannot be explained using concepts of 
   Western social science, see Hamaguchi Esyun's "A Contextual Model of the Japanese : Toward 
   a Methodological Innovation in Japan Studies" (Hamaguchi, 1985) 
13. One of the foremost contenders for Russia's presidency, General Aleksandr Lebed, boasted on 
   television that Russia was a great country, citing as evidence his claim that 84 [or 86, I don't 
   recall the exact figure] of all discoveries and inventions were made by the Russians, and then 
   stolen and claimed by others. 
14. See also van Wolferen, 1989. Some writers have referred to the Japanese political system as an 
   onion : you peel and peel, and in the end there is nothing at the core. 
15. Here I borrow from Gudykunst and Kim, 1984. 
16. The following discussion is based on a handout prepared by Dr. Bruce La Brack, of the 
   University of the Pacific, distributed at the panel on "Communicating Across Cultures" at the 
   Twelfth Worldwide Conference of People to People International, Newport Beach, California, 
   September 25-29, 1996. 
17. Such degree of gratuitous insults may have been motivated by the Chinese negotiator's desire 
   to establish his bona fides as genuinely anti-American and anti-imperialist for consumption 
   back home. 
18. Ambassador Edamura Sumio made this point during his comments on my paper, "The Psycho-
   logical Dimensions of Japanese Negotiating Behavior," at the Kyoto Conference on Japanese 
   Studies, October 1994 (Berton, 1996) 
19. Professor John Graham's comments on my paper (Berton, 1995) at a special meeting of the 
   Southern California Japan Seminar at the UCLA Faculty Center, February 11, 1995.
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